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Linda McQuaig, The Cult of Impotence: Selling the Myth of Powerlessness in 
the Global Economy (Toronto: Penguin Canada 1998). 
In the final quarter of 1998 the gathering momentum of global financial crisis 
pushes relentlessly at the frail prosperity of Canada and the other privileged 
economies of consolidated capitalism. Finance Minister Martin, only recently 
the proud darling of the executive class for conquering the budget deficit "come 
hell or high water," now infuriates both organized labour and some businesses 
with a plan to seize the surplus in the unemployment insurance fund claiming it 
is necessary to cope with the mounting world recession. He hesitates to admit 
that recession will engulf Canada. What is really on his mind is preserving the 
integrity of both the embattled Canadian dollar and the probity of the Bank of 
Canada and the Finance Department monetary strategy. 
Simultaneously a hedge fund gambler in New York nearly produces a world 
wide melt down in the financial community when his highly leveraged elite fund 
miscalculates on European bond price movements. The result is intervention by 
the US Federal Reserve to cobble together a bailout loan arguing that the $120 
billion failure would jeopardize the highly interrelated financial system. Those 
with a memory saw the spectre of the 193 1 collapse of the Creditanstalt. Those 
who found the event incomprehensible will benefit from this book. 
Linda McQuaig, in The Cult of Impotence, describes the forces and 
economic ideas now commanding Canadian (European and American) leaders. 
This is a very valuable study of what is presently the dominant ideology, who 
produced it and how it works. The body of ideas she examines is used to justify 
all manner of outrageous practices to reverse historic reforms and drive the 
"popular" classes back into a standard of living common early in the twentieth 
century. Any such study must reveal different class interests in financial reward 
and therefore in both "theoretical" interpretation and policy choices. McQuaig 
adopts simple rich and non-rich expressions for these differences. "The position 
favoured by the first camp has sometimes been identified as 'right-wing,' the 
second as 'left-wing,' although we could just as easily call them the 'market' 
position and the 'popular' position." (28) 
One important reason why the book is valuable is that the writing about 
complex struggles over economic strategy is so very accessible to non- 
specialists. McQuaig makes arcane concepts such as non-accelerating rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU), understandable to a lay audience and explains why it 
is "the most vicious euphemism ever coined." She personalizes the economic 
strategy debate, pitting Martin and his advisers, such as David Dodge, the C.D. 
Howe Institute economists and Bay Street bankers, against such opponents as 
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Liberal MP Douglas Peters, Finance research economist Rodney Schmidt and 
American economists William Vickery and James Tobin. 
By presenting ideas in relation to personalities the reader absorbs the drama 
of real struggle over policies to benefit the wealthy and powerful on the one hand 
versus the "popular" forces on the other. "This book is about . . . exploring the 
real limits of what is possible and what isn't in this age ofthe global economy. Is 
full employment possible? How about well-fbnded public health and education 
systems or a clean environment? Or is only all-night banking possible?'(l7) 
Since it is an axiom of conventional discourse today that globalization, with 
its causes in technological information explosion and uncontrollable market 
forces, makes independent government action impossible, McQuaig focuses on 
the reality of that claim of impotence. She begins by identifying a sample of 
players in this cult of impotence, the Department of Finance and its Minister, the 
Business Council on National Issues, the editorial voices of the Globe and Mail, 
stockbrokers such as David Jones ("If you inhibit cash flows, the alternative is 
war") and London School of Economics professor lan Angel1 explaining 
blandly how most of the working population will soon be redundant. 
But because their views rest on what some believe to be more substantial 
economic theory, she describes what Milton Friedman has bequeathed to these 
opinion and decision makers. The most important of Friedman's nefarious ideas 
for present purposes is the proposition that there is a natural rate of 
unemployment for every economy and there is nothing governments can or 
should do to alter that fact. In exploring this body of ideas McQuaig juxtaposes 
the later work of William Vickery, who won the Nobel economics prize in 1996, 
and some of those in the profession who opposed Friedman's ideas. This is a 
chapter that nicely illustrates McQuaig's ability to make difficult arguments of 
theory and the policy implications flowing from them accessible to lay persons. 
She always makes it clear why the information she develops is important to the 
"popuIarW camp. 
Since the study has principally to do with the purported impotence of the 
Canadian government, she returns her attention to the way the dominant economic 
ideology of the Friedman era worked itself out in Ottawa and on Bay Street. The 
method is to develop the adversary figure of Douglas Peters, a maverick Toronto 
Dominion Bank chief economist who argued that while the federal budget deficit 
was important, the way to attack it was not through draconian interest rate 
increases and social program slashing, but through employment strategies that put 
the economy to work. Peters was elected with the Liberal government in 1993 and 
soon found himself in a losing battle with the neo-liberals in Finance whose 
primary task was to capture and domesticate Martin. 
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McQuaig also brings her magnifying glass to bear on Bank of Canada 
Governor John Crow's mean interest rates of the 1980s and early 90s. In his 
successor, Gordon Thiessen, those ideas live on. For these, the relation between 
high rates of unemployment and avoidance of inflation are paramount. They 
explain that the government and Bank of Canada policy of restraint is dictated 
by the mercurial behavior of the market and capricious investors. McQuaig 
responds by describing the alternatives of the Tobin tax and direct capital 
controls (such as the one year residency requirement for incoming investment in 
Chile and Columbia). The tax would put a low duty on every cross-border 
investment or disinvestment: not too large to discourage investment but too 
expensive for rapid cash movements of speculators. Her description of how it 
would work, who favours it, who opposes it and why are all developed, again, by 
introducing James Tobin himself and interviews with key actors. 
Lurking in the background of her examination of the claim of 
powerlessness and impotence is the economic theoretical giant John Maynard 
Keynes who fought the repressive orthodoxy of the pre-World War Two 
financiers and economists who used the gold standard to discipline domestic 
government policy. She follows his career to the realm of international trade 
where he and Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury Department in 1944 
crafted the Bretton Woods Agreement that created the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank. 
Despite what these institutions have subsequently become, for Keynes and 
White the strategy was to prevent international finance from interfering with 
governments responding to popular forces to enact social programs, full 
employment and regulatory policies. Her point is that Keynes and his supporters 
at the time and afterwards used economic theory to empower governments to 
respond to democracy. The opponents such as Friedman devised theories to 
curtail democratically elected governments and empower the tiny elite who 
control the world's wealth. 
As the book concludes Linda McQuaig writes: 
To an alarming extent, we have become convinced that we are collectively 
powerless in the face of international financial markets. And with the 
widespread acceptance of this view, the rich have proceeded to create a world 
in which the rights of capital have been given precedence over and protection 
against interference from the electorate. In spite of democracy, they have 
largely succeeded in creating a knave proof world. (283) 
The reference is to the anti-democratic purposes of the gold standard as 
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advocated by a nineteenth century British Treasury official for whom the claims 
of the ordinary people of Britain were knavish. (1 89) 
In truth, the international financial community is already full of 
governmental and industry regulations and controls. Her description of the Bank 
for International Settlements is an example. Yet these are self (and self-serving) 
regulations, not those designed to prevent capital from controlling governments. 
Further, there are numerous alternatives to resist "market" domination of 
governments which are presently ignored or denied to be possible by 
governments. The message is we are not prisoners of a natural and impersonal 
global market though politicians may be reluctant and frightened to use their 
power. 
Referring to economist Pierre Fortin's evidence, she says, "Canada can 
have the autonomy to pursue policies aimed at full employment and well-funded 
social programs." 
Ottawa has implied that it is powerless to enact such policies, since fully 
mobile capital will flee. But . . . this failure of government to deliver on 
these policies is not because of any real powerlessness. Rather, it springs 
from an unwillingness on the part of government to allow the national 
currency to drop in value when necessary - for fear of angering the 
influential financial constituency. Thus, what we have now is not real 
impotence but a self-imposed variety. (235) 
Of course, since this book was published the value of the Canadian dollar 
has plummeted and unemployment has declined somewhat. But there has been 
no commensurate shift in strategy to favour government stimulation of the 
economy. Instead economists and policy makers watched helplessly as stock 
markets sagged and investors ran for cover. Through the third quarter of 1998 
there was no agreement about what if anything should be done. Contrary to 
prediction, a low interest rate, low dollar value, declining unemployment did not 
dnve away investors. But the Globe and Mail editors were adamant. An 
economic growth strategy is wrong, favouring instead exclusive use of any 
budget surplus on debt reduction. (23 Sept. 1998)Yet, as the October meeting of 
the IMF approached, Paul Martin and the Globe agreed some way had to be 
found to control speculative international investment. 
This is exactly the environment in which the pressure of the financial 
community may produce enhanced supervisory powers for the IMF in exchange 
for expanded credit to bail out threatened national economies. As McQuaig says, 
"We are being told that we should put in place regulations that curb the power of 
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democratic governments to serve popular interests so that the interests of 
financial capital can be protected." (272) 
The author's understanding and ability to present difficult information and 
thought in a way intelligent non-professionals can grasp is a great service. To do 
so she uses many metaphors that enliven the presentation. But there is always a 
danger metaphorical analogies will obscure even as they illuminate. For 
example, she correctly targets the present Liberal government as "presiding over 
a long-term redirection of our national income away from government 
programs. They are taking us much closer to the US model, with lower taxes and 
smaller government." (8) But it is not self-evident how the smaller American 
government is measured. 
Most readers will likely identify with Linda McQuaig's critique of the neo- 
liberal project for its destruction of social and economic reforms hard won 
during the thirty years following World War Two. More important, they will 
endorse her criticism that this project constitutes a hndamental attack on 
democracy itself. It may not be so evident that capitalist democracy is what she 
defends. C.B. Macpherson demonstrated it is virtually impossible to yoke 
together capitalism and democracy to satisfy the potential involved in each. It is 
McQuaig's argument that Keynes (and the subsequent economists and policy 
figures following him) showed us how the reconciliation could be achieved. 
McQuaig says about MIT economist Rudi Dornbusch, espousing the Tobin tax, 
as she herself does, he "argues . . . for the Tobin tax partly on the grounds that it 
would make the capitalist system function better." (166) What is needed is to 
regain Keynes' spirit of the possible and use the existing tools to restore 
government for the people. 
But it is clear from Keynes' own history and the fate of his reforms that this 
kind of democracy does not belong to the "popular" classes. We need a different 
kind of state and a democracy that is not limited by the requirements of the tiny 
elite who control capital. The Keynesian reforms adopted were not the ones that 
would have eliminated the rentier class; that tiny minority of the population for 
whom so much is done to protect capital. As McQuaig shows (2 16-220), they 
were not the reforms that would have established capital export controls co- 
operatively enforced by the major trading nations. 
Just as metaphors can disguise complexities and understanding at the same 
time they enlighten, so personalizing theory and policy arguments can mislead. 
McQuaig portrays Paul Martin as an unwilling recruit to neo-liberal economics. 
But what is most important for a person in his position is who he represents, not 
simply how he appears. For example, she recounts a sharp confrontation 
between Martin and the editorial board of the Globe and Mail after the 1994 
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budget when business columnist Andrew Coyne pursued the Finance Minister 
sharply. "Coyne was saying what the dull accountant types in the department had 
long been saying [that harsher cutback of social programs than the mild cuts in 
the 1994 budget was needed to bring down the deficit] and he was saying it 
publicly in a way that embarrassed Martin in front of the audience he most cared 
about." (90, emphasis added) Martin (and all political, business, military, labour, 
academic figures) are put in positions where they must decide who they serve or 
who they represent or who they side with, regardless of what else they hold dear 
in their lives. 
In part because of the method of personalizing policies, the discussion of 
the Bretton Woods Agreement is not entirely satisfactory. For McQuaig the 
principal creator of the Agreement was Keynes and it "was a radical thirty-year 
experiment in which the rights of the population as a whole were given a higher 
priority than the rights of capital holders. Those thirty years were arguably the 
best years 'ordinary people' have ever seen." (238) 
But it is misleading to attribute the prosperity of post World War Two 
capitalism to the Bretton Woods Agreement. The availability of a great deal of 
forced saving, the active state sponsored construction in Europe (wirtschaji 
wunder) and North America (suburbanization), the social democratic alliance, 
the rise of consumerism all contributed to "the golden age" and cannot be 
reduced to the Bretton Woods Agreement. Moreover, the account ignores the 
way in which the Agreement permitted the United States to expand its economic 
domain and "export" its inflation for almost two decades, obliging its trading 
partners to absorb the cost of sinking dollar values. This was not empowering to 
twelve democratically elected European governments, nor their citizens. At one 
point de Gaulle attempted to counteract the effect by hoarding gold. 
The celebration of Keynes reaches the point where McQuaig declares that 
he laid out a plan for economic empowerment "producing for the first time in 
history a system in which the needs and desires of ordinary people had to be 
taken into account." (247) Some justification for such a statement is due in light 
of nearly two centuries of socialist thought and system building. Even if the 
conclusion is that socialism failed, it was certainly a system in which the needs 
and desires of ordinary people were to be taken into account. 
This may be the best of Linda McQuaig's important contribution to 
contemporary Canadian criticism. Her work is reminiscent of the much 
maligned Muckrakers of the turn-of-the-century. Authors who delved into the 
workings of the new corporate giants and the politicians who facilitated their 
rise and demonstrated the corrupting of democracy and the Lincoln-Republican 
dream. Robert Lynd's great Knowledgefor What of the 1930s also resonates in 
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her exposition of economic theory. The Cult of Impotence is important because 
it opens for public and popular understanding the mystified subject of money, 
banking, international finance and economic strategy. Even if the concern is 
limited to making capitalism more humane and accountable, this study is an 
excellent example of what critical liberal thought can provide in the service of 
preserving or restoring democracy. 
Joseph K. Roberts 
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